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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
Julio Hernandez appeals his conviction for conspiring to 
obstruct interstate commerce by robbery in violation of 18 
U.S.C. SS 1951 (a) and 2, and receiving or possessing goods 
stolen from commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 659. He 
argues that the District Court erred in defining reasonable 
doubt to the jury, in sustaining objections to certain oral 
statements which defense counsel sought to admit into 
evidence, and in allowing jurors to ask questions of 
witnesses. Because we agree that the District Court's 
definition of reasonable doubt was likely to cause 




This case arises from the highjacking of a tractor trailer 
truck containing 494 cases of cigarettes valued at 
$335,125.00. On the morning of Friday, June 13, 1997, 
Jose Sanchez was delivering the shipment of cigarettes 
when a van cut him off and forced him to stop his truck. 
Washington Alvarez jumped out of the van waiving a gun 
and ordered Sanchez to roll down the window and get out 
of the truck. Sanchez complied with the demand, but only 
after he pressed a panic button inside the truck that was 
designed to silently signal an alarm. 
 
As Sanchez was forced from his truck, another 
individual, later identified as Julio Hernandez, got in. 
Alvarez lead Sanchez to a nearby van and forced him to get 
in. When Sanchez got inside, Alvarez placed duct tape over 
his eyes and taped his hands together. After Alvarez 
finished binding Sanchez, a third individual named Luis got 
out of a second van and joined the confederate who had 
gotten into Sanchez' truck. The conspirators then drove off 
with Sanchez' truck and its cargo, and Alvarez drove off 
with Sanchez. Sanchez was eventually released, and sought 
help from a police officer who lived nearby. Alvarez was 
arrested a short time later. 
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Meanwhile, a satellite tracking device inside the stolen 
truck disclosed the truck's location to police. As the truck 
was backed into a docking space at a gas station, the police 
arrived, secured the scene, and questioned onlookers about 
the whereabouts of the driver. A garage at the gas station 
had been converted to a warehouse, and after the police 
conducted their investigation they arrested Hernandez who 
had been unloading cases of cigarettes from the truck and 
placing them inside the warehouse. Police searched 
Hernandez pursuant to that arrest and found Sanchez' 
cigarette lighter inside a package of cigarettes that was 
inside Hernandez' shirt pocket. Hernandez later gave a 
statement in which he explained that he had borrowed a 
cigarette from men who had offered him a job unloading the 
truck. He explained that he never returned the cigarettes 
because the men left when the police arrived.1 According to 
Hernandez, the lighter was inside the pack of cigarettes 
when he got it. 
 
Hernandez stood trial on charges of conspiring to 
obstruct commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1951(a) 
(count 1), obstructing commerce by robbery in violation of 
18 U.S.C. SS 1951(a) and 2 (count 2); and receiving and 
possessing goods that had been stolen from interstate 
commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. SS 659 and 2 (count 3). 
 
Alvarez testified against Hernandez pursuant to a plea 
bargain. He testified that Hernandez had jumped into 
Sanchez' truck after Sanchez was forced out of it, and that 
Hernandez then drove it away with Luis, and one other 
conspirator. Hernandez' trial lasted only four days, but the 
jury deliberated for three days without reaching a verdict. 
Finally, on the third day, after the trial judge gave a 
modified Allen charge, the jury convicted Hernandez on 
counts 1 and 3, but acquitted him of the charges in count 




We turn first to Hernandez' challenge to the District 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Police did briefly detain two men, but allowed them to walk away after 
brief questioning. 
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Court's practice of allowing jurors to participate in 
questioning witnesses during the course of the trial. The 
District Court allowed jurors to pose questions by handing 
the court written questions for the court's review. It 
appears from this record (and appellant does not argue to 
the contrary) that the court would then allow the attorneys 
to see the question so that counsel could make whatever 
objections they deemed appropriate, and the court could 
thus determine the admissibility and propriety of a 
question outside the hearing of the jury before asking the 
question. 
 
One juror did submit a question in this manner. The 
juror asked: "[w]hat kind of rear doors are on the rear of 
the trailer?" App. at 644. However, the court did not ask 
the question of the witness. Rather, the court allowed the 
attorneys to decide what, if any, response each would make 
to the question. The court then gave the following 
explanation to the jury: 
 
       Let me just say with regard to questions that are 
       presented by a witness, -- by a juror, it well may be a 
       particular witness who is on the stand at the time may 
       not be the person to whom such a question would be 
       addressed because he may not be a witness who may 
       be in a position to answer the question. 
 
        We appreciate having your questions because now 
       the attorneys on both sides know what inquiries you 
       would make and either they may address them 
       through their closing arguments, or they know if they 
       wish to bring any additional witnesses to address the 
       question, that would be up to them. 
 
App. at 644-45. Defense counsel immediately objected to 
the question, even though the court never asked it. When 
court reconvened the following day, defense counsel 
reiterated her objection, and requested that the court 
conduct voir dire of the juror who had submitted the 
question. Defense counsel argued that the substance of the 
question, as well as its timing, suggested that the juror 
assumed Hernandez was guilty. The court denied the 
request stating: 
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       That . . . is an unreasonable request because there is 
       nothing to suggest the juror had any notions of guilt. 
       It merely reveals a juror had a question about the 
       truck and what the truck was like. This was a fact 
       question. There was nothing in the way the question 
       was worded which suggested guilt, innocence, anything 
       other than was the light red or was the light green? It 
       was purely a fact question. 
 
       I think it was handled appropriately. 
 
App. at 675-76. Defense counsel now insists that 
 
       [b]y permitting the jurors to act as inquisitors and 
       declining to investigate alleged jury misconduct 
       following the suspect question, the court denied 
       Hernandez his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial 
       before an impartial jury. Juror questioning of witnesses 
       is a "procedure fraught with perils. In most cases, the 
       game will not be worth the candle." United States v. 
       Sutton, 970 F.2d 1001, 1005 (1st Cir. 1992). 
 
Appellant's Br. at 37. However, there is nothing here to 
suggest "jury misconduct" other than the unsupported 
inference that the juror who posed the question had 
reached a decision about the defendant's guilt before the 
end of the trial. Although defense counsel's argument urges 
such an assumption upon us, we refuse to jump to that 
conclusion. There is nothing in this record to suggest that 
the juror who posed the question was motivated by 
anything other than a desire to know about the rear doors 
on the highjacked truck. We will not violate the sanctity of 
the jury by requiring a judge to probe into the motivation 
behind such an innocuous question. 
 
Defendant's more general challenge to the propriety of 
allowing juror questioning is an issue of first impression in 
this circuit, and requires more discussion. Although we 
have not previously addressed this issue, several other 
courts of appeal have. Although those courts have 
consistently expressed concern over the dangers of the 
practice, they have refused to adopt a rule prohibiting juror 
questioning of witnesses during the course of a criminal 
trial. See United States v. Bush, 47 F.3d 511 (2d Cir. 1995); 
United States v. Ajmal, 67 F.3d 12, 14 (2d Cir. 1995); 
 
                                5 
  
United States v. Cassiere, 4 F.3d 1006, 1017-18 (1st Cir. 
1993); United States v. George, 986 F.2d 1176, 1178 (8th 
Cir. 1993); DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 
F.2d 512, 516 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Callahan, 
588 F.2d 1078, 1086 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. 
Gonzales, 424 F.2d 1055, 1055 (9th Cir. 1970). We take 
this opportunity to approve of the practice so long as it is 
done in a manner that insures the fairness of the 
proceedings, the primacy of the court's stewardship, and 
the rights of the accused.2 
 
In United States v. Polowichak, 783 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 
1986), the court disapproved the practice of posing juror 
questions in front of other jurors. The court stated that the 
trial judge should require questions to be submitted in 
writing, without disclosure to other jurors, "whereupon the 
court may pose the question in its original or restated form 
upon ruling the question or the substance of the question 
proper." Id. at 413. 
 
In United States v. Stierwalt, 16 F.3d 282 (8th Cir. 1994), 
the court held that the District Court did not err where 
questions were submitted in writing and all evidentiary 
issues were resolved before the judge read the questions to 
the witness. See id. at 286. See also George, 986 F.2d at 
1178-79 (holding that despite the fact that the jury 
submitted 65 written questions to the court, the court 
employed proper formal procedures in that the questions 
were discussed with the attorneys and ruled upon by the 
judge). 
 
In United States v. Bush, supra, jurors directly 
questioned witnesses, including the defendant. Defense 
counsel failed to object, and even engaged in a dialogue 
with the jurors.3 The practice of allowing such questioning 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Our discussion is in the context of this criminal trial. We note, 
however, that properly structured juror questioning in a civil trial poses 
even fewer of the risks than we are concerned with here. Moreover, 
allowing jurors in both civil and criminal trials to pose questions for 
the 
court's consideration is consistent with modern concepts of trial 
practice. 
See Verdict: Assessing the Civil Jury System Robert E. Litan ed. (1993). 
 
3. After the defendant had answered one of the questions asked by a 
juror, defense counsel asked the juror: "does that answer your question 
sir?" 47 F.3d at 512. 
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was therefore reviewed for plain error. The courtfirst noted 
that "[w]e have already held . . . that direct questioning by 
jurors is a `matter within the judge's discretion, like 
witness-questioning by the judge himself.' " Id. at 514. The 
court noted that "[e]very circuit court that has addressed 
this issue agrees. State courts, moreover, have 
overwhelmingly placed juror questioning of witnesses within 
the trial judge's discretion, and indeed its common law 
roots are deeply entrenched." Id. at 515 (citations omitted). 
Nevertheless, the court expressed concern over this 
practice. "Although we reaffirm our earlier holding . . . that 
juror questioning of witnesses lies within the trial judge's 
discretion, we strongly discourage its use." Id. The court 
listed several dangers endemic to the practice including 
"turning jurors into advocates, compromising their 
neutrality," the "risk that jurors will ask prejudicial or 
otherwise improper questions," and counsel's inability to 
respond for fear of antagonizing, alienating, or 
embarrassing a juror. Id. The court noted that 
 
       [b]alancing the risk that a juror's question may be 
       prejudicial against the benefit of issue-clarification will 
       almost always lead trial courts to disallow juror 
       questioning, in the absence of extraordinary or 
       compelling circumstances. 
 
Id. at 516. However, the court affirmed the conviction 
because the challenged questioning had been "limited and 
controlled" and because the defendant could not 
demonstrate prejudice. Id. 
 
In United States v. Sutton, 970 F.2d 1001 (1st Cir. 1992), 
the court voiced similar concerns about allowing jurors to 
question witnesses even though the procedure used 
involved the court asking questions that the jurors had 
submitted in writing. Id. at 1005. Once again, the court 
allowed the practice though it was clearly troubled by it. 
"Although we think this practice may frequently court 
unnecessary trouble, we find no error in the circumstances 
of this case." Id. at 1003. There, at the beginning of the 
trial, the trial court had informed the jurors that they could 
ask questions by handing written questions to the jury 
foreman who would then give them to the judge. "If your 
question even possibly could make any legal difference . . . 
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if it's relevant as the lawyers say, I'll ask it for you." Id. On 
appeal, the court stated: 
 
       Allowing jurors to pose questions during a criminal 
       trial is a procedure fraught with perils. In most cases, 
       the game will not be worth the candle. Nevertheless, we 
       are fully committed to the principle that trial judges 
       should be given wide latitude to manage trials. We are, 
       moreover, supportive of reasoned efforts by the trial 
       bench to improve the truth seeking attributes of the 
       jury system. Consistent with this overall approach, and 
       mindful that the practice . . . may occasionally be 
       advantageous, especially in complex cases and under 
       carefully controlled conditions, we hold that allowing 
       juror-inspired questions in a criminal case is not 
       prejudicial per se, but is a matter committed to the 
       sound discretion of the trial court. 
 
Id. at 1005. Although the court allowed the practice, it was 
quick to discourage it. "We hasten to add that the practice, 
while not forbidden, should be employed sparingly and with 
great circumspection." Id. The court also added to the list 
of concerns enunciated in Bush, though it acknowledged 
that the practice could further the search for truth by 
allowing jurors to clear up confusion. The court also 
recognized that allowing jurors to participate in questioning 
could enhance the attentiveness of jurors. Nevertheless, the 
court concluded "in most situations, the risks inherent in 
the practice will outweigh its utility." Id. 
 
In United States v. Ajmal, supra, the court did reverse a 
conviction based upon juror questioning of witnesses, even 
though the judge had "incorporated prophylactic 
procedures to lessen the potential prejudice. . . ." 67 F.3d 
at 15. The Second Circuit noted that the trial judge's 
decision to invite such questioning 
 
       was not necessitated by the factual intricacies of this 
       banal drug conspiracy, nor . . . prompted by the urging 
       of jurors themselves. Rather, the District Court, as a 
       matter of course, established at the outset of the trial 
       that jurors would be allowed to question witnesses. 
       Indeed, the District Court encouraged juror questioning 
       throughout the trial by asking the jurors at the end of 
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       each witness's testimony if they had any queries to 
       pose. Not surprisingly, the jurors took extensive 
       advantage of this opportunity to question witnesses, 
       including Ajmal himself. 
 
Id. at 14 (emphasis added). The trial judge there had taken 
precautions. He had required questions to be in writing, 
and the court, rather than the attorneys, asked the 
questions. In addition, the court only asked those questions 
that it believed were proper under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals held that the 
trial judge had abused his discretion. 
 
       Although the District Court substantially complied with 
       the procedures this Court advocated in Bush,. . . such 
       measures alone cannot purge the harm caused by the 
       extensive juror questioning in the case at hand. 
       Regardless of the procedures adopted by the District 
       Court to vet questions, there must be ample 
       justification for adopting the disfavored practice in the 
       first instance. To hold otherwise would sanction juror 
       questioning of witnesses in any circumstance, so long 
       as appropriate prophylactic measures are adopted. We 
       cannot accept such a proposition. 
 
        In light of our discussion above, the District Court's 
       encouragement of juror questioning of witnesses . . . 
       was an abuse of discretion. 
 
67 F.3d at 15 (emphasis added). Thus, although the court 
was once again concerned with the practice of allowing 
juror questioning absent circumstances sufficient to justify 
the risk inherent in the procedure, the court clearly based 
its reversal upon the trial court's encouragement of such 
questioning, and the frequency with which jurors had 
accepted the judge's invitation. 
 
Here, the court received only one question from the jury. 
It was a fact question that was not even asked. We do not 
think that one fact question which is submitted to a judge 
in writing, but not even asked, can be labeled an abuse of 
discretion. See United States v. Lewin, 900 F.2d 145 (8th 
Cir. 1990). In Lewin, jury questioning was deemed proper 
where the jury tendered six questions to the court and the 
court only asked four of them. The questions that the court 
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allowed were "specific and factual in nature," and no 
questions were asked of the defendant. Id. at 147-48. The 
court of appeals noted that "this [was] not a case in which 
juror questioning was allowed to become disruptive or 
abusive." Id. Moreover, the court suggested appropriate 
safeguards. "[I]f [the District Court] decides to permit jurors 
to ask questions in future trials, it should consider 
requiring jurors to submit their questions in writing, or 
orally out of the presence of the other jurors, without prior 
discussion with the other jurors." Id. at 148. 
 
We agree that a trial judge who allows such questioning 
in a given case should adopt a procedure to first screen the 
questions. However, we conclude that the dangers of 
allowing jurors to ask questions orally far outweighs any 
perceived benefit of allowing juror questioning of witnesses. 
Thus, the judge should ask any juror-generated questions, 
and he or she should do so only after allowing attorneys to 
raise any objection out of the hearing of the jury. 
 
The procedure utilized here is consistent with our 
admonitions and consistent with the sound exercise of 
judicial discretion. The court did not surrender its 
discretion as to whether to allow a given question to be 
asked, and the judge, not the attorneys (and certainly not 
the jurors), was to have asked any questions posed by a 
juror. This procedure is consistent with the holding of every 
court of appeals that has addressed this issue. We hold 




At trial, defense counsel attempted to have a witness 
testify that when police approached Hernandez at the gas 
station, Hernandez told them that "he was there unloading 
a truck and expected to be paid for his labor." Appellant's 
Br. at 18. The District Court ruled that the statement was 
inadmissible hearsay. Hernandez argues that this 
statement should have been admitted under the state of 
mind exception contained in Federal Rule of Evidence 
803(3). We afford the District Court's evidentiary rulings 
plenary review insofar as the court was interpreting a rule 
of evidence. However, we review the court's rulings on 
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admissibility for abuse of discretion. See United States v. 
Donley, 878 F.2d 735, 737 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) states: 
 
       The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, 
       even though the declarant is available as a witness: 
 
       . . . 
 
       (3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical 
       condition. A statement of the declarant's then existing 
       state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition 
       (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, 
       pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement 
       of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or 
       believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, 
       identification, or terms of declarant's will. 
 
The state of mind exception is usually traced to the 
Supreme Court's holding in Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 
145 U.S. 285 (1892). There, the Supreme Court held that 
letters in which a missing person expressed an intent to 
travel to Crooked Creek could be introduced to help 
establish the identity of an unidentified body later found 
there. The Court reasoned that "[t]he existence of a 
particular intention in a certain person at a certain time 
being a material fact to be proved, evidence that he 
expressed that intention at that time is as direct evidence 
of the fact as his own testimony that he then had that 
intention would be." Id. at 295. Thus, while the letters were 
not proof that the deceased actually went to Crooked Creek, 
they tended to show that at least prior to his death, he 
intended to. Id. at 295-96. 
 
The rule is now firmly established that "[t]here are times 
when a state of mind, if relevant, may be proved by 
contemporaneous declarations of feeling or intent." Shepard 
v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933). However, the 
scope of this exception must be limited to prevent it from 
devouring the rule. Thus "[s]tatements that are considered 
under . . . the `state of mind' exception, cannot be offered 
to prove the truth of the underlying facts asserted." 
Stelwagon Mfg. Co. v. Tarmac Roofing Sys., Inc. , 63 F.3d 
1267, 1274 (3d Cir. 1995). See also Blackburn v. Aetna 
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Freight Lines, Inc., 368 F.2d 345, 348 (3d Cir. 1966), 
(holding "[i]t is too well settled to require discussion that a 
declaration of a state of mind or intention is admissible to 
prove that the declarant actually had such intention."). 
 
Thus, in United States v. Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d 841 
(3rd Cir 1996), we affirmed the District Court's exclusion of 
testimony that a witness named Hernandez had said,"nice 
to meet" you when introduced to a person named 
Avenando. The proponent wanted to use the statement as 
evidence that the two had not previously met. We 
concluded that use of the statement was improper because 
"statements offered to support an implied assertion are 
inadmissible hearsay." Id. at 857 (citing United States v. 
Reynolds, 715 F.2d 99, 104 (3rd Cir. 1983)). Here, 
Hernandez' statement that he had just arrived and expected 
to be paid was only relevant because of the implied 
assertion that he was not involved in the highjacking. 
 
Appellant relies on United States v. DiMaria, 727 F.2d 
265 (2d Cir. 1984), to support his argument that the state 
of mind exception applies. In DiMaria, the defendant was 
prosecuted for his involvement in stealing cigarettes. His 
defense was that he thought that no tax had been paid on 
the cigarettes ("bootleg cigarettes"), but that he did not 
know they were stolen. In support of that position, defense 
counsel attempted to introduce evidence that the defendant 
told FBI agents arriving on the scene: "I thought you guys 
were just investigating white collar crime; what are you 
doing here? I only came here to get some cigarettes real 
cheap." Id. at 270. The District Court excluded that 
statement ruling that it was inadmissible hearsay. The 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. That 
court held that the defendant's comment "stated, or so the 
jury could find, that his existing state of mind was to 
possess bootleg cigarettes, not stolen cigarettes. It was not 
offered to prove that the cigarettes were not stolen 
cigarettes but only to show that DiMaria did not think they 
were. . . . It was a statement of what he was thinking in the 
present." Id. at 271. The court also recognized that the 
Federal Rules of Evidence opted for the view that"the self- 
serving nature of such a declaration went only to its 
weight." Id. The court reasoned that"[t]here is a peculiarly 
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strong case for admitting statements like DiMaria's, 
however suspect, when the Government is relying on the 
presumption of guilty knowledge arising from a defendant's 
possession of the fruits of a crime recently after its 
commission." Id. at 272. 
 
DiMaria is distinguishable from the instant case. Here, 
Hernandez' statement that he was unloading a truck is not 
evidence of his state of mind. Rather, it is his out of court 
statement of why he was at the gas station, and what he 
was doing there. Accordingly, it does not fall within Rule 
803(3), or any other exception to the general prohibition 
against hearsay evidence. Although his statement that he 
expected to be paid arguably falls within DiMaria's 
interpretation of Rule 803(3), we believe it is only relevant 
because of the implicit assertion that Hernandez was a 
laborer, and not involved in a highjacking. Accordingly, the 
District Court properly excluded it as required by Palma- 
Ruedas. To the extent that DiMaria would require a 
different result, we are clearly bound by our own precedent, 




Hernandez also alleges that the District Court's definition 
of "reasonable doubt" violated his Fifth Amendment right to 
due process and his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. 
"In reviewing whether a District Court in its charge to the 
jury correctly stated the appropriate legal standard, our 
review is plenary." United States v. Johnstone, 107 F.3d 
200, 204 (3d Cir. 1997). Jury instructions, taken as a 
whole, must "clearly articulate the relevant legal standards" 
and "avoid confusing and misleading the jury." Id. at 204. 
When an attack upon a jury charge is based upon the 
trial court's instruction on reasonable doubt, "[t]he 
constitutional question . . . is whether there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow 
conviction based on proof insufficient to meet the 
[constitutional] standard." Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 6 
(1994). Such a reasonable likelihood exists here. 
 
It is axiomatic that "[t]he Due Process Clause requires the 
government to prove a criminal defendant's guilt beyond a 
 
                                13 
  
reasonable doubt," therefore, "trial courts must avoid 
defining reasonable doubt so as to lead the jury to convict 
on a lesser showing than due process requires." Id. at 22. 
Nonetheless, District Courts are not required to define 
"reasonable doubt" as a matter of course. Id. at 5. 
Moreover, when a trial judge does define the term, no 
"particular form of words" is required. Id. The law requires 
only that the concept be correctly conveyed to the jury 
when it is defined. Id. (citing Holland v. United States, 348 
U.S. 121, 140 (1954)). 
 
Reasonable doubt is not an easy concept to understand, 
and it is all the more difficult to explain. Moreover, given 
the concerns about crime that are so prevalent in today's 
society, common sense suggests that it is particularly 
difficult for lay jurors to understand that they must acquit 
a criminal defendant if the prosecution does not establish 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, even if they feel that the 
defendant is probably guilty. Jurors may well be reluctant 
to free someone accused of a serious and violent crime 
"merely" because the government didn't prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt what they feel "in their hearts" is 
probably true. Yet, due process is satisfied by nothing less 
than a juror's understanding that he or she may not vote 
to convict a defendant based upon a belief "that the 
defendant is probably guilty. . . ." Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 
U.S. 275, 278 (1993) (emphasis added). Rather, an 
impartial evaluation of evidence is required. "A juror is 
impartial if he or she can lay aside any previously formed 
`impression or opinion as to the merits of the case' and can 
`render a verdict based on the evidence presented in 
court.' " United States v. Polan, 970 F.2d 1280, 1284 (3d 
Cir. 1992). Reasonable doubt is, therefore, a doubt based 
upon reason rather than whim, possibilities or supposition. 
Id. at 1286. 
 
Here, the District Court commented upon proof at 
different points during the trial. The court first commented 
upon reasonable doubt during the course of jury selection. 
The court informed potential jurors: 
 
       [THE COURT]: Now, ladies and gentlemen, a criminal 
       case comes before you by way of indictment and the 
       Government has to prove the elements of the offense, 
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       each offense in the indictment beyond a reasonable 
       doubt, each count has to be proven beyond a 
       reasonable doubt. 
 
        And if the Government fails to prove to your 
       satisfaction each and every element of each count, then 
       you would return a verdict of not guilty. If the 
       Government does prove a count beyond a reasonable 
       doubt, including each and every element, then you 
       would return a verdict of guilty. 
 
       You are to be thoughtful, systematic, analytical, 
       impartial, unbiased. . . . 
 
        Under our system of justice, the Government carries 
       the burden of proof in a criminal case. The Government 
       brings the charge. The Government has to prove the 
       charge. . . . 
 
        How do you decide if they have been proven? There 
       is no scale we can say all right, this is how you can 
       weigh the evidence. It's really an internal process that 
       you must engage in. You have to use your judgment, 
       your maturity, your powers of analysis, your sense of 
       what makes -- what sounds reasonable, what sound 
       [sic] likely. Does this sound like what happened or does 
       that sound like I can't believe that's what happened? 
       You have to decide that. 
 
App. at 121-22 (the "voir dire instructions"). 4 
 
After the jury was empaneled, but before the jury began 
hearing evidence, the court told the jury: 
 
       The burden of proof is on the Government. The 
       Government brings the charges. The Government has 
       to prove the charges. The grand jury has been 
       impaneled by the Government. The defendant doesn't 
       appear before the grand jury. The grand jury hears the 
       evidence and decides whether an indictment shall 
       issue, and you are the body to decide whether the 
       charges are to be sustained. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. For clarity, we will separately characterize each of the portions of 
the 
District Court's comments to the jury that are relevant to this appeal. 
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       How do you decide that? By whether the Government 
       can prove the guilt of the charges of this defendant 
       beyond a reasonable doubt. That's the standard. 
 
       How do you decide what is proof beyond a reasonable 
       doubt? There is no specific definition. I'm sorry to tell 
       you, but there are none. It's what you in your own 
       heart and your own soul and your own spirit and your 
       own judgment determine is proof beyond a reasonable 
       doubt. 
 
       I'll give you some definitions at the end of the trial 
       when I give the Judge's charge to the jury, but don't 
       expect it to be the kind of ruler or measuring rod that 
       you are going to be able to say: Uh-huh, now, I know 
       what proof beyond a reasonable doubt means. It's what 
       you feel inside as you listen to the evidence, and so 
       that's why you really have to pay attention from the 
       very beginning. 
 
       I'm going to have each witness put his or her name up 
       on the easel there so you can just see that. That kind 
       of helps you to focus. The government will call its 
       witnesses first because that's the way a case proceeds. 
       Each witness is called by the Government, questioned 
       by counsel for the Government, cross-examined by the 
       defense lawyer, counsel for the defense, and then, one 
       by one, they come in and go out. 
 
       Then the Government rests at the end of its 
       presentation of witnesses. 
 
       Then the defendant has an opportunity to present any 
       witnesses he wants to present. He doesn't have to. He 
       is free to present anybody he wants. 
 
       Then both sides rest. 
 
       Then the lawyers on each side give what we call a 
       closing argument. They summarize what has been 
       presented in the trial and the Judge gives the Judge's 
       charge to the jury. When I do that, I'll give you 
       something written so you can read along with me. 
       That's when I'll define proof beyond a reasonable 
       doubt. I'll define the presumption of innocence, what 
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       does that mean. I'll define robbery. I'll define the 
       various terms that you will hear throughout the trial. 
 
App. at 175-76 (emphasis added) (the "initial instruction"). 
Defense counsel objected, and the court responded in an 
effort to impress upon the jurors the importance of the 
reasonable doubt concept. The court stated: 
 
       I don't want you to think that it is so ephemeral that 
       it's meaningless or so subjective that it's an unworthy 
       concept. It is a very important concept. It's indeed the 
       backbone of the criminal law that proof must be 
       convincing to a jury as to the guilt of a defendant 
       beyond a reasonable doubt. And you will have to 
       analyze the proofs so as to decide in your own mind: 
       Was this proven beyond a reasonable doubt? 
 
App. at 13 (the "clarification"). 
 
At the end of the trial the District Court gave what 
defendant refers to as a "traditional charge" on reasonable 
doubt. There, the court explained: 
 
        Under our system, the judge is the final arbiter of all 
       questions of law and the jury in its deliberations must 
       follow the law as given to it by the judge. It is the 
       judge's function to instruct you in the law. 
 
        You are not to be concerned with the wisdom of any 
       rule of law. . . . 
 
       *** 
 
        Each phase of the instructions is to be considered 
       and applied together with all other parts and phases of 
       the instructions. You must not pick out some 
       particular instruction alone or some particular portion 
       of an instruction and overemphasize it and apply it 
       without considering and keeping in mind all the other 
       instructions given you with regard to this case. 
 
        You should construe each of the instructions in light 
       of and in harmony with the other instructions. You 
       should apply the instructions as a whole to the 
       evidence. The order in which the instructions are given 
       has no significance and is no indication of their relative 
       importance. . . . 
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       *** 
 
        A defendant is never to be convicted on mere 
       suspicion or conjecture. The burden is always upon the 
       prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
       This burden never shifts to a defendant for the law 
       never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case the 
       burden or duty of calling any witness or testifying 
       himself or producing any evidence. 
 
        If after a fair, impartial and careful consideration of 
       all the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt as to a 
       defendant's guilt, it is your duty to acquit him. . . . 
 
        Now, what is reasonable doubt? Now, I'll try to define 
       that. Reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is doubt 
       based on reason and common sense. A reasonable 
       doubt is such a doubt as would cause you to hesitate 
       to act in matters of importance in your own lives. A 
       reasonable doubt may arise from a lack of evidence. It 
       is doubt based on reason, logic, common sense and 
       experience. Reasonable doubt is not vague or 
       hypothetical doubt. It is not speculative, imaginary 
       qualms or misgivings. It is not just an excuse by a 
       juror to avoid the performance of an unpleasant duty. 
       It is not the normal sympathy which one human being 
       may hold for another. 
 
App. at 800-1 (the "traditional charge"). 
 
We first address Hernandez' assertion that portions of the 
voir dire instructions require a new trial. He argues that 
"[b]ased on the court's remarks, the jury may have believed 
incorrectly that a conviction could be based on what they 
felt in their hearts or what sounded likely." Appellant's Br. 
at 18. He asserts that "the court's sounds likely test 
reduced the constitutionally required standard of proof to a 
mere preponderance of the evidence." 
 
However, the portion of the voir dire instructions that 
Hernandez challenges has nothing to do with reasonable 
doubt, nor do we think the jurors could have interpreted 
the comments to suggest a definition of that concept. 
Rather, the court was simply explaining how jurors go 
about determining if a witness is telling the truth. Its 
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comments amounted to nothing more than a suggestion 
that jurors ask themselves whether testimony has the 
proverbial "ring of truth," and we find no error in the court 
having done so. See Altmose Construction Co. v. NLRB, 514 
F.2d 8, 15 n.8 (3d Cir. 1975) (noting the proverbial ring of 
truth in the noncriminal context); NLRB v. Nichols-Dover, 
Inc., 414 F.2d 561, 564 (3d Cir. 1969) (same). We reach a 
different result, however, with regard to the court's 
explanation of reasonable doubt. 
 
Defendant acknowledges that the traditional charge was 
proper, but argues that the initial instruction stated an 
incorrect definition of reasonable doubt, and also suggested 
that the jury could ignore the correct definition in the 
traditional charge by warning jurors that the traditional 
definition would not be helpful.5 Appellant's Br. at 18. The 
government responds in part by arguing that the judge's 
initial instruction was meant merely to give an overview of 
the trial procedure. The government cites Guam v. Ignacio, 
852 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1987), to argue that "[i]nstructions 
given at the start of a case simply do not have the same 
impact and therefore importance as instructions given to 
the jury at the close of a case, just before the case is 
submitted for the jury's deliberation." Appellee's Br. at 14. 
However, we believe that Ignacio, and the other cases relied 
upon by the government actually support Hernandez' 
argument. 
 
In Ignacio, the trial court gave some general preliminary 
instructions that included instructions on reasonable 
doubt. The instruction that the court gave was, however, 
incomplete, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
had previously ruled that the instruction "standing alone," 
was erroneous under Guam law. Ignacio, 852 F.2d at 461. 
However, the court's final charge "adequately cured the 
incomplete instruction. . . ." Id. Here, the initial instruction 
suggested that jurors could convict the defendant based 
upon what they believed in their own heart, soul and spirit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. "There is no specific definition. I'm sorry to tell you, but there are 
none. It's what you in your own heart and your own soul and your own 
spirit and your own judgment determine is proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt." App. at 175. 
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whether or not that belief was based upon a reasoned 
conclusion that the evidence established Hernandez' guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, it was erroneous, 
not merely incomplete. The distinction is substantial. 
Subsequent amplification can fill the interstices in an 
incomplete explanation. However, when an erroneous 
instruction is given, a subsequent clarification must be 
sufficiently clear and compelling to allow a reviewing court 
to conclude that there was no reasonable likelihood that 
the initial inaccuracy affected the jury's deliberations. 
Victor, supra. Here, the government does not even maintain 
that the court's explanation that reasonable doubt is "what 
you feel inside" was correct. Rather, the government urges 
us either to ignore this language or to minimize its 
significance because of the subsequent clarification. In 
Ignacio, the court stated: 
 
       [g]eneral orientation at the beginning of a trial should 
       be cautiously worded, but it will not require reversal 
       unless it produces prejudice or misleads the jury in a 
       material way. 
 
Id. at 461. Allowing a jury to determine reasonable doubt as 
to each element of a crime based upon what "you in your 
own heart and your own soul and your own spirit and your 
own judgment determine is proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt" clearly misleads the jury in a material way, to the 
prejudice of the defendant. It allows each juror to judge the 
evidence by a visceral standard unique to that juror rather 
than an objective heightened standard of proof applicable to 
each juror. It allows jurors to convict based upon their 
individual "gut feeling." 
 
In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), the Court 
stated 
 
       The standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt . . . 
       plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal 
       procedure, because it operates to give concrete 
       substance to the presumption of innocence to ensure 
       against unjust convictions and to reduce the risk of 
       factual error in a criminal proceeding. At the same time 
       by impressing upon the factfinder the need to reach a 
       subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the 
 
                                20 
  
       accused, the standard symbolizes the significance that 
       our society attaches to the criminal sanction and thus 
       to liberty itself. 
 
443 U.S. at 315 (emphasis added) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).6 Thus, although a juror must subjectively 
believe that a defendant has been proven guilty, that 
subjective belief must be based upon a reasoned, objective 
evaluation of the evidence, and a proper understanding of 
the quantum of proof necessary to establish guilt to a "near 
certitude." An instruction which allows a juror to convict 
because of his or her subjective feelings about the 
defendant's guilt, without more, is clearly inadequate. Here, 
as Judge Sloviter quite correctly notes in her thoughtful 
and forceful dissent, the District Court did tell the jury that 
their verdict had to be based upon the evidence, and that 
the government had the burden of proof. See dissent at 31. 
However, a likelihood of confusion remained as to the 
quantum of evidence necessary to sustain a conviction, and 
the level of certainty that a juror had to have as to the 
defendant's guilt, because the original explanation of 
reasonable doubt may well have remained in the juror's 
minds. Thus, a juror may well have concluded that a"gut 
feeling" as to the defendant's guilt was adequate to convict 
so long as that feeling was supported by a preponderance 
of the evidence (or even less). The reasonable likelihood that 
this may have happened is not mitigated merely because 
jurors understood that the government had the burden of 
proof. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 322 (1985). 
Moreover, the remaining cases that the government relies 
upon are not to the contrary. See Appellee's Br. at 14. 
 
In United States v. Hegwood, 977 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 
1992), defense counsel failed to object to the court's initial 
definition of the crime of conspiracy. Id. at 495. The 
definition that the court gave did not inform the jurors that 
an intent to commit the substantive crime was an element 
of the conspiracy. However, the court's final instructions 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In Jackson, the defendant was convicted in a bench trial. Thus, the 
Court was not considering the effect of an erroneous reasonable doubt 
standard on a lay jury. Nevertheless, as the dissent quite correctly 
notes, 
the language of Jackson is relevant to our discussion. 
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did inform the jury of that element. On appeal, the 
erroneous initial instruction was reviewed for plain error. 
The court relied upon Ignacio to hold that, absent 
exceptional circumstances, "[w]here the instruction 
challenged is given at the beginning of trial, reversal is 
unwarranted unless the defendant can prove prejudice or 
that the jury was materially misled." Id. The court then 
stated that no exceptional circumstances existed and it 
therefore would not assume that the jurors failed to follow 
the correct instruction. It was the only instruction they had 
on whether the government had to prove intent to commit 
the substantive offense. The court reasoned that 
 
       [i]t stretches credulity to think that the jury 
       disregarded the instruction they had just been given 
       because it included an element that had not been 
       mentioned earlier. 
 
Id. (citing Franklin, 471 U.S. at 322)). The situation here is 
far more problematic than an inquiry into whether 
providing a missing element cured its earlier omission. 
Indeed, our situation is more akin to the problem in 
Franklin, supra. There, a defendant was charged with 
murder in connection with a fatal shooting that occurred 
after he had escaped from state custody. The defendant's 
sole defense was that the gun had accidentally discharged. 
The trial judge instructed the jury that one is presumed to 
intend the natural consequences of his or her actions, but 
that the presumption may be rebutted. The court also 
informed the jury that the defendant was presumed 
innocent, and that the prosecution had the burden of 
proving each element of the crime charged beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
 
Following his conviction, the defendant appealed alleging 
that the court's charge had improperly shifted the burden 
of proof to him, and that the language in the charge 
clarifying the burden of proof did not cure the infirmity. The 
Supreme Court agreed. 
 
       A reasonable juror could easily have resolved the 
       contradiction in the instruction by choosing to abide by 
       the mandatory presumption and ignore the prohibition 
       of presumption. Nothing in these specific sentences or 
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       in the charges as a whole makes clear to the jury that 
       one of these contradictory instructions carries more 
       weight than the other. Language that merely 
       contradicts and does not explain a constitutionally 
       infirm instruction will not suffice to absolve the infirmity. 
       A reviewing court has no way of knowing which of the 
       two irreconcilable instructions the jurors applied in 
       reaching their verdict. 
 
Franklin, 471 U.S. at 322 (emphasis added). That is 
precisely our situation. Indeed, our situation is worse 
because in the initial instruction the District Court 
suggested that jurors would derive little guidance from the 
definition that would be given at the end of the trial. Jurors 
who may have been confused by the more abstract 
traditional charge may well have relied upon the court's 
earlier assessment of the definition, and adopted the more 
easily understood standard of what you feel "in your heart 
and soul" to determine if the defendant's guilt had been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
The dissent believes that the initial instructions"were 
really comments rather than instructions . . . ," and 
concludes that they were not sufficient to create a 
reasonable likelihood of prejudice under Victor v. Nebraska, 
especially since they were immediately followed by a 
curative instruction. Dissent at 31. However, nothing in 
this record suggests that lay jurors drew this fine 
distinction, or that they were even aware of it. Moreover, 
the jury was never instructed to ignore the substantive 
portion of the court's initial instructions in determining the 
meaning of reasonable doubt. We do not suggest that the 
problems created by the initial instruction could not have 
been cured. Rather, we hold that the instructions taken as 
a whole (including the clarification) were not adequate to 
"unring" the bell. The clarification stressed the importance 
of the concept of reasonable doubt, and emphasized that it 
was not an "ephemeral" concept. However, it did not 
provide an accurate definition of the term, or instruct 
jurors to rely exclusively upon the written definition they 
would receive at the end of the trial. When the jurors finally 
heard the correct definition they had been forewarned that 
the definition they were hearing was less helpful than the 
prior erroneous explanation of what the term meant. 
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We are also unconvinced by the government's reliance 
upon United States v. Dilg, 700 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1981). 
See Appellee's Br. at 15-6. In Dilg, two juries were selected 
simultaneously. One was to hear Dilg's case, and the other 
was to be "on deck" to hear a trial that would start after 
Dilg's was finished. After both juries were selected, the 
judge gave general instructions that included instructions 
as to the presumption of innocence. Dilg's jury was then 
sworn, and the other jury was excused until later in the 
week.7 
 
At the conclusion of Dilg's trial the court gave a formal 
charge that informed the jury of the government's burden of 
proving every element beyond a reasonable doubt, but did 
not mention the presumption of innocence. On appeal the 
defendant argued that this omission required a new trial. 
The prosecution countered that the jurors had been 
informed of the presumption of innocence in the court's 
general comments before trial and this cured the omission. 
The court of appeals disagreed. 
 
       There was no indication that the preliminary 
       instructions were intended as the sole source of any 
       aspect of the law by which the case was to be decided. 
       To make matters worse, at no time during the 
       instructions given at the close of the trial did the judge 
       refer back to the pre-trial instruction given on the 
       presumption of innocence. 
 
Dilg, 700 F.2d at 625. Here, it is clear that the initial 
instructions were not intended to be the "sole source" of the 
law the jury was to apply. Although the final charge did not 
"refer back to the court's preliminary comments," Appellee's 
Br. at 15, it did not have to. The seed had already been 
planted, and nothing in the final charge diminished the 
fertility of that seed. 
 
The government urges us to adopt a rule giving thefinal 
charge more weight than instructions given during the 
course of the trial because it was given immediately before 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Because we find that the instructions given during voir dire were not 
erroneous we need not decide the effect of an erroneous instruction that 
is given before jurors are sworn. 
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deliberations, and the initial instructions were muted by 
the passage of time having been given earlier in the trial. 
See Appellee's Br. at 15. We refuse to adopt a rule that 
would judge the significance of a preliminary jury 
instruction by the length of the trial absent instructions 
from the trial court that would cause jurors to place more 
weight on the final charge than instructions given during 
the course of the trial. We will not assume that jurors, 
contrary to their oath, ignored part of the judge's initial 
instruction simply because it came early in the trial.8 "The 
[law] presumes that jurors, conscious of the gravity of their 
task, attend closely the particular language of the trial 
court's instructions in a criminal case and strive to 
understand, make sense of, and follow the instructions 
given them." Franklin, 471 U.S. at 324. We will not now 
hold that the importance of a jury instruction is determined 
by its proximity to the end of the trial. 
 
Similarly, we disagree with the dissent's assessment of 
the importance of "one sentence in an overview that covers 
eight pages." Dissent at 32. Clearly, one sentence can not 
be viewed out of context with the totality of the judge's 
instructions. Neither can that one sentence be ignored 
when viewing the eight pages of which it is a part. Thus, we 
can not agree that our holding is based upon "unfounded 
speculation that the jurors disregarded clear instructions." 
Dissent at 33 (citing United States v. Newby, F.3d 1143, 
1147 (3d Cir. 1993).9 Rather, this conviction can stand only 
if we engage in unfounded speculation that jurors followed 
the proper written instruction despite the court's statement 
that it was not going to help them. See Franklin, 471 U.S. 
at 322 ("[a] reviewing court has no way of knowing which of 
the two irreconcilable instructions the jurors applied in 
reaching their verdict."). Here, the jury was given two 
explanations of reasonable doubt. One was incorrect, and 
one was not. Due Process does not allow us to guess which 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Moreover, we note that this trial only lasted four days. 
 
9. In Newby, the curative instruction as to improperly admitted evidence 
"was clear and effective," and the evidence in question was, "at most 
cumulative." Id. at 1146. Here, the curative instruction was neither clear 
nor effective, and the error requiring a curative instruction was far more 
serious. 
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definition the jurors adopted so long as there is a 
reasonable likelihood it chose the wrong one. Victor, 511 
U.S. at 6. We hold only that, given the totality of the unique 
circumstances here, that reasonable likelihood exists. 
 
The government's position to the contrary is rooted in the 
axiom that jury instructions must be viewed in their 
entirety, and a series of cases that have reaffirmed that 
principle. See United States v. Isaac, 134 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 
1998); United States v. Pine, 609 F.2d 106 (3d Cir. 1979); 
United States v. Smith, 468 F.2d 381 (3d Cir. 1972). 
Accordingly, the government relies upon Hegwood, to argue 
that "even assuming arguendo that the court's preliminary 
instructions were faulty, they were outweighed and indeed 
cured by the court's correct final charge." Appellee's Br. at 
14. The government contends that the instructions, taken 
as a whole, adequately conveyed the concept of reasonable 
doubt and that there was, therefore, no reasonable 
likelihood that the jury understood the standard of 
conviction to be less than beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
However, as noted above, "[l]anguage that merely 
contradicts and does not explain a constitutionally infirm 
instruction will not suffice to absolve the infirmity." 
Franklin, 471 U.S. at 322. Thus, although the soundness of 
the principle underlying the government's argument is 
beyond dispute, we do not think it cures the infirmity in the 
initial instruction. Accordingly, we conclude that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that jurors utilized an improper 
definition of reasonable doubt and convicted the defendant 
not because the government proved its case beyond a 
reasonable doubt as that term is properly understood, but 
because the jurors "felt" the defendant was guilty.10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Our holding today is not intended to discourage the very common 
practice of providing jurors with preliminary remarks to assist them 
during the course of the trial. We only hold that when such preliminary 
instructions are given, jurors must not be allowed to guess at which of 
two conflicting instructions control their deliberations. This can be 
avoided by simply informing jurors which instructions control in the 
event they perceive a conflict between something they are told during the 
course of the trial, and something contained in the formal instructions 
that will follow the close of the evidence. 
 




For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of 
conviction will be reversed, and the matter will be 
remanded to the District Court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge, Concurring: 
 
I join in the thorough analysis, and result reached, by my 
colleague, but write briefly only to offer an additional 
practical reason as to why the purported cure by the 
District Court judge was not an adequate fix. 
 
I have great faith in jurors, but think it asks too much to 
expect them to cast aside the court's initial instruction that 
reasonable doubt is incapable of definition and is based on 
what you feel inside, when later they are told its more 
analytic underpinnings. It strikes me as an exceedingly 
difficult if not impossible task. 
 
If students of film were told before viewing afilm that 
there are no set rules for assessing a film and they should 
trust their heart and soul, then later, after viewing it, they 
are told to comment on it using a "reasoned" approach, will 
they not cling nonetheless to the impressions formed 
throughout the viewing based on their emotional reaction? 
I think we are naive if we think not. 
 
Reasonable doubt is difficult enough without the 
confusion evident on this record. Can we trust that a juror 
who adheres to the judge's instruction and determines in 
her heart and soul that the defendant is probably guilty will 
be able to perform the mental gymnastics to replace all she 
has observed and felt with a reasoned weighing of the 
government's case (assuming she has made the effort to do 
so in the face of initial instructions that the later definition 
will be of little help)? I am dubious. 
 
While it is true that a trial court's guidance as provided 
in most preliminary instructions will pale in significance as 
compared to the final dictates given, that is not the case if 
the particular instruction guides the jury's perceptions and 
observations as much as, or even more than, their ultimate 
decision making. 
 
Further, I do not agree with our dissenting colleague that 
our holding that this particular miscue was not cured poses 
any threat to the concept of cure beyond the limits of this 
unique fact pattern. 
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge, Dissenting: 
 
I approve and join in Parts I, II and III of the majority's 
opinion. I dissent from Part IV because I do not agree that 
we should reverse a conviction when, as we all agree, the 
trial court gave the jury complete and accurate instructions 
on reasonable doubt before the jury deliberated. The 
majority overturns the conviction on the basis of language 
with which the District Court described reasonable doubt in 
preliminary comments made to the jury before they heard 
opening statements or evidence. However, in light of the 
majority's concession that there was no error in the 
instruction on reasonable doubt when it was included in 
the charge that was given to the jury four days later, 
immediately before the jury proceeded to deliberate, the 
effect of the majority's decision is to elevate those 
preliminary comments to incurable error. In my view, the 
majority's result is serious error, both because in the 
circumstances here the erroneous instructions, if any, were 
cured and because, as a general principle, incurable error 




The trial of Julio Hernandez began on February 4, 1998, 
on a three-count superseding indictment charging (count 1) 
conspiracy to obstruct, delay and affect commerce and the 
movement of commodities in commerce by robbery of a 
tractor-trailer and the contents thereof, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. S 1951(a); (count 2) obstructing, delaying and 
affecting commerce and the movement of articles and 
commodities in commerce by robbery, and threatening 
physical violence to a person in furtherance of a plan to rob 
a tractor-trailer and its contents, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
SS 1951(a) and 2; and (count 3) receiving and possessing 
with the intent to convert to his own use goods and chattel, 
namely 494 cases of cigarettes valued at over $250,000 
that had been embezzled and stolen from a motortruck and 
were moving as part of an interstate shipment, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. SS 659 and 2. 
 
The jury received comments and/or instructions from the 
trial judge on reasonable doubt on three separate 
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occasions. The first occasion was on February 4 during 
what the majority characterizes as the "voir dire 
instruction." Hernandez contends that because the court 
stated in the course of those comments that the jurors 
would have to use their sense of "what sounds likely" in 
evaluating the evidence, he was entitled to a new trial. The 
majority rejects Hernandez's contention and concludes that 
there was no error in the remarks made by the District 
Court at that time. 
 
The third occasion was the formal jury charge, given to 
the jury orally and in writing on February 13, before it 
proceeded to deliberate. The defendant does not challenge 
the instruction and the majority finds that charge to be 
without error. That instruction fully incorporates all of the 
relevant elements of a reasonable doubt charge, which the 
majority refers to as the "traditional charge" on reasonable 
doubt. In it, the District Court stated as follows: 
 
       Now, what is reasonable doubt? Now, I'll try to define 
       that. Reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is doubt 
       based on reason and common sense. A reasonable 
       doubt is such a doubt as would cause you to hesitate 
       to act in matters of importance in your own lives. A 
       reasonable doubt may arise from a lack of evidence. It 
       is doubt based on reason, logic, common sense and 
       experience. Reasonable doubt is not vague or 
       hypothetical doubt. It is not speculative, imaginary 
       qualms or misgivings. It is not just an excuse by a 
       juror to avoid the performance of an unpleasant duty. 
       It is not the normal sympathy which one human being 
       may hold for another. 
 
        It is not necessary for the United States or the 
       Government to prove the guilt of a defendant to a 
       mathematical certainty or beyond all possible doubt. 
       The reason is in this world of ours, it is practically 
       impossible for a person to be absolutely and completely 
       convinced regarding any disputed fact which by its 
       nature is not susceptible of mathematical certainty. 
       Consequently, the law is such that in a criminal case 
       it is sufficient if the proofs establish that a defendant 
       is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, not beyond all 
       possible doubt. 
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        Reasonable doubt is an honest and reasonable 
       uncertainty existing in your mind as to the guilt of the 
       defendant after carefully considering all the evidence. A 
       reasonable doubt may be said to exist in any case 
       when after a careful consideration of all of the evidence 
       the jury would be unwilling to rely upon that evidence 
       unhesitatingly in a matter of importance in its own 
       affairs. 
 
App. at 800-02. 
 
The majority's decision to reverse Hernandez's conviction 
thus rests on its conclusion that the remarks made by the 
District Court on the second occasion, February 9, 
immediately after the jury was sworn and before the 
opening statements, which the majority characterizes as 
"the initial instructions," were such flagrant error as to 
mislead the jury and be incurable. 
 
These remarks are quoted in full in the majority's 
opinion. What are the majority's objections? 
 
The majority focuses on the statement made by the 
District Court, after it advised the jury that there is no 
specific definition of reasonable doubt (a patently accurate 
comment), that "[i]t's what you in your own heart and your 
own soul and your own spirit and your own judgment 
determine is proof beyond a reasonable doubt." App. at 
175. The majority has two objections: this statement 
"allows each juror to judge the evidence by a visceral 
standard unique to that juror, rather than an objective 
heightened standard of proof applicable to each juror," 
Majority Opinion at 20, and it "allows jurors to convict 
based upon their individual gut feeling.' " Id. The majority 
fails to acknowledge that in those remarks, which were 
really comments rather than instructions, the District 
Court emphasized, at the outset of even that initial stage, 
that "[t]he burden of proof is on the Government. The 
Government brings the charges. The Government has to 
prove the charges." App. at 175 (emphasis added). Nor does 
the majority specify what the jurors were told that might 
lead them to look to their "gut feelings" rather than the 
evidence to which the District Court repeatedly referred. 
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If the majority's objection to the language used by the 
District Court is that it improperly suggests a subjective 
approach, then the majority is inconsistent with the 
Supreme Court's articulation of the concept of reasonable 
doubt as a "subjective state of near certitude," Jackson v. 
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979) (emphasis added); see In 
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
 
The majority's objection to the District Court's"initial 
instructions" takes those comments out of context. It gives 
short shrift to the government's argument that these 
comments were merely meant to give an overview of the 
trial procedure. An examination of the court's entire 
presentation at that time reveals that the court was 
providing precisely that overview. See generally  Federal 
Judicial Center, Benchbook for U.S. District Court Judges 95 
(4th ed. 1996) (Preliminary jury instructions "are intended 
to give the jury, briefly and in understandable language, 
information to make the trial more meaningful."). The 
District Court began by explaining the jury's function and 
role, that witnesses will be called, that there will be 
interpreters, who the lawyers will be, that the burden of 
proof is on the Government, the sequence of events, where 
the jurors could lunch, and the courtroom procedures to be 
followed. The comment to which the majority objects is one 
sentence in an overview that covers eight pages. App. at 
172-79. 
 
The District Court emphasized the preliminary nature of 
those comments, stating on several occasions that the 
charge and the instructions would be given to the jury at a 
later time. Immediately after the language on which the 
majority focuses, the District Court expressly told the 
jurors that it would give them "some definitions at the end 
of the trial when I give the Judge's charge to the jury." App. 
at 175. Shortly thereafter, the court, continuing its 
explanation of the sequence of events that would follow, 
stated that after the lawyer on each side makes a closing 
argument, "the Judge gives the Judge's charge to the jury. 
When I do that, I'll give you something written so you can 
read along with me. That's when I'll define proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. I'll define the presumption of innocence, 
what does that mean. I'll define robbery. I'll define the 
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various terms that you are hearing throughout the trial." 
App. at 176 (emphasis added). The court's procedure was 
consistent with common practice, under which the formal 
instructions containing precise definitions are left for the 
end of trial, following a formal charge conference. 
 
There is no reason to assume that the jurors were 
unaware that the formal instructions and definitions, 
including that for reasonable doubt, would be given later in 
light of the District Court's clear statements to that effect. 
Just as we assume that jurors follow the accurate, formal 
instructions of the court, see Opper v. United States, 348 
U.S. 84, 94 (1954) ("To say that the jury might have been 
confused amounts to nothing more than an unfounded 
speculation that the jurors disregarded clear instructions of 
the court in arriving at their verdict. Our theory of trial 
relies upon the ability of a jury to follow instructions."); 
United States v. Newby, 11 F.3d 1143, 1147 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(jury presumed to follow curative instructions regarding 
stricken evidence absent "overwhelming probability" jury 
was unable to follow it), we should assume that the jurors 
here listened to the judge's preliminary instructions 
regarding when and how they would receive their formal 
ones. 
 
Even were this not enough to show that there was no 
prejudicial error from the court's overview at the beginning 
of the trial, this conclusion is reinforced by the District 
Court's clarification of the import of the earlier language as 
soon as counsel objected. At sidebar, defense counsel 
stated: 
 
        I'm also objecting to the Court's lack of definition of 
       burden of proof as far as reasonable doubt is 
       concerned as something you feel inside which suggests 
       they can go with some sort of a gut or bias or prejudice 
       or some feeling about the case, while beyond a 
       reasonable doubt is the highest burden we have in our 
       system of justice. 
 
App. at 182. 
 
Contrary to the majority's suggestion that what it regards 
as the infirm instruction was not corrected, but merely 
contradicted by the final charge, the District Court took 
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steps almost immediately in response to counsel's 
objection. After reviewing the indictment with the jury, the 
court stated as follows 
 
        Now, I have told you proof beyond a reasonable 
       doubt will be defined in my charge, just as I will 
       explain at greater length presumption of innocence. 
       Because I refer to the fact that proof beyond a 
       reasonable doubt has no accurate measuring rod, I 
       don't want you to think that it is so ephemeral that it's 
       meaningless or so subjective that it's an unworthy 
       concept. It is a very important concept. It's indeed the 
       backbone of the criminal law that proof must be 
       convincing to a jury as to the guilt of a defendant 
       beyond a reasonable doubt. And you will have to 
       analyze the proofs so as to decide in your own mind: 
       Was this proven beyond a reasonable doubt? 
 
App. at 191. 
 
In light of the prompt correction to the remarks that the 
majority finds objectionable, the court's emphasis to the 
jury that the instruction on reasonable doubt would be 
given later (and in writing), and the majority's 
acknowledgment that the final instructions on reasonable 
doubt were not objectionable, I believe that there is no 
reasonable likelihood that the jurors were misled to use an 
improper definition of reasonable doubt in finding 
Hernandez guilty. 
 
I believe the majority's reversal of a conviction based on 
its view that the court's preliminary remarks were incurable 
is out of step with the precedent. Underlying our 
jurisprudence is recognition that error will occasionally be 
made, even error of constitutional magnitude, but that 
most error either can be cured through an instruction or 
has not prejudiced a defendant's right so substantially that 
the conviction must be reversed. See generally Donnelly v. 
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 644 (1974) ("Although some 
occurrences at trial may be too clearly prejudicial for . . . a 
curative instruction to mitigate their effect, the 
[prosecutor's comment that defendant hoped to be 
convicted of a lesser charge] is hardly of such character."); 
United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1265 (3d Cir. 
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1995) (en banc) ("In determining prejudice, we consider the 
scope of the objectionable [prosecutorial] comments and 
their relationship to the entire proceeding, the ameliorative 
effect of any curative instructions given, and the strength of 
the evidence supporting the defendant's conviction."); 
Newby, 11 F.3d at 1146 ("[W]e presume that the jury will 
follow a curative instruction [regarding stricken evidence] 
unless there is an `overwhelming probability' that the jury 
will be unable to follow it and a strong likelihood that the 
affect of the evidence would be `devastating' to the 
defendant." [citations omitted]); United States v. Menichino, 
497 F.2d 935, 945 (5th Cir. 1974) ("[A]ny harm done by the 
[mid-trial] charge was vitiated by the later proper and 
curative instructions."). To evaluate a claimed error in a 
jury instruction, as in this case, an appellate court must 
look to the charge as a whole. See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 
U.S. 1, 5 (1994). 
 
There was extensive analysis of two reasonable doubt 
instructions by the Supreme Court in Victor, where the 
petitioners challenged their reasonable doubt instructions. 
In one case, the petitioner challenged the charge that 
defined reasonable doubt in terms of "moral evidence" and 
"moral certainty," but the Court, although not condoning 
use of those terms, nevertheless concluded that they 
neither suggested a standard of proof lower than required 
by due process nor allowed conviction on factors 
extraneous to the government's proof. Id. at 16. In the other 
case, the Court held that the instruction that a reasonable 
doubt is "not a mere possible doubt" also did not require 
reversal because other language in the instruction made 
clear the meaning of that instruction. Similarly, the Court, 
while agreeing that the trial court's equating of a 
reasonable doubt with a "substantial doubt" was 
problematic, nonetheless concluded that "taken as a whole, 
the instructions correctly conveyed the concept of 
reasonable doubt to the jury." Id. at 22. 
 
It is significant that Justice O'Connor, speaking for the 
Court in Victor, pointed out that "in only one case have we 
held that a definition of reasonable doubt violated the Due 
Process Clause." Id. at 5. In the case to which she referred, 
Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (per curiam), the 
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Court held that an instruction defining a reasonable doubt 
to be "an actual substantial doubt" was fatally defective 
because it suggested a higher degree of doubt than is 
required for acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard. 
Id. at 41. Certainly, the alleged error here in the court's 
preliminary, overview remarks is in no way equivalent with 
that in Cage, particularly as the error, if any, was followed 
by a prompt cure and, ultimately, a fully correct charge. 
 
The majority suggests that the decision in Francis v. 
Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985), may be analogous to this 
case. Not so. The instructions in Franklin were not defective 
because of the reasonable doubt portion of the charge but 
because the instruction on intent effected a mandatory 
presumption in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's 
requirement that the state prove every element of a criminal 
offense. 
 
In fact, in Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954), 
the Court, in considering the petitioner's challenge to a 
reasonable doubt charge in a federal criminal trial, agreed 
that there were problems with the charge, which"should 
have been in terms of the kind of doubt that would make 
a person hesitate to act . . . rather than the kind on which 
he would be willing to act. . . ," but nevertheless declined 
to reverse, noting "the instruction as given was not of the 
type that could mislead the jury into finding no reasonable 
doubt when in fact there was some." Id. at 140. 
 
Similarly, in this case, I see no basis to conclude that the 
court's initial comments to the jury in an overview of the 
procedure that was to take place could have misled the 
jury. Although the court may not have adopted the most 
felicitous expression in its overview, both the curative 
instruction and the final charge were correct. The District 
Court's final jury instructions emphasized that"[a] 
defendant is never to be convicted on mere suspicion or 
conjecture"; "[r]easonable doubt is not vague or 
hypothetical doubt"; "[i]t is not speculative, imaginary 
qualms or misgivings." App. at 801. Those final instructions 
correctly conveyed the meaning of reasonable doubt and 
adequately neutralized whatever misleading effect may have 
been caused by the "what you feel inside" language in the 
remarks some four days earlier. 
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Our zealousness to insure that a defendant has had a 
fair trial and that justice has been done does not mean that 
every error, although corrected, must lead to reversal. In 
this case, I disagree with my colleagues that a small portion 
of the trial court's initial comments, which were promptly 
corrected and later neutralized by the final charge, requires 
reversal of Hernandez's conviction. I therefore respectfully 
dissent. 
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